Thursday, July 24, 2014

MOTION PRACTICE IN NEW JERSEY FAMILY COURTS

 
Motion Practice in New Jersey Family Courts
 
By: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq.
 
An application to the court for relief in the form of an enforceable order is generally by motion or, in certain special circumstances, by an application for an order to show cause. There are as many types of motions as there are issues to be decided in the family court including, but not limited to, motions to provide support, fix custody and parenting time, enter injunctive relief, enforce a prior court order, and award counsel fees and costs.
 
In the majority of circumstances all motions must be in writing. Ordinarily, the “motion papers” to be filed with the court and served upon the other party include the notice of motion, supporting certification or affidavit, legal argument in the form of a legal brief or letter memorandum, and proposed form of order. The Rules of Court contain specific requirements as to all papers to be filed with the court – for example, all papers must be prepared on 8.5” x 11” letter-sized paper, with double-spaced 10 or 12-point font, be within the applicable page limits, and must be signed and dated by the attorney of record or a pro se party.
 
If a motion does not rely on facts already in the court’s record, it must be supported by affidavit or, as is more common, a supporting certification. An affidavit or certification must be made on personal knowledge, and must not contain improper matter – for example, the certification must comply with the rules of evidence (hearsay, privilege, etc.). The affiant must sign and date the certification after inclusion of the following statement: “I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.”
 
Because motion practice can be expensive, it is important (in non-emergent matters) to make every good faith effort to resolve all contested issues prior to seeking intervention of the court. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure that your application has adequate support in the law prior to filing. Motions without sufficient legal basis, as well as motions made in bad faith, can result in an award of attorney fees and costs to be paid by you to your adversary. Accordingly, you may wish to consult with an experienced family law attorney if you are considering making application to the court. This article is for information purposes only, and is neither legal advice nor the creation of an attorney client relationship.
 
Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq.
 

Saturday, May 24, 2014

A Brief Overview of the New Jersey Criminal Code: What is a Disorderly Persons Offense?


A Brief Overview of the New Jersey Criminal Code: What is a Disorderly Persons Offense?
 

By: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq.

There are six classes of offenses under the New Jersey Criminal Code: in increasing severity – petty disorderly persons offenses (“petty DP”), disorderly persons offenses (“DP”), fourth degree crimes, third degree crimes, second degree crimes, and first degree crimes. Petty DP and DP offenses are not crimes – when the term “crime” is used, this refers to offenses of the fourth degree or higher. When the term “offense” is used, however, not only are petty DP and DP offenses included, but all crimes as well. With some exceptions, motor vehicle offenses are specifically excluded from the meaning of “offense” and, therefore, are neither an “offense” nor a “crime” under New Jersey law.

Another important distinction between a lower-level offense and a crime is that a defendant accused of a petty DP or DP offense is not entitled to a trial by jury or an indictment by a Grand Jury. Although petty DP offenses and DP offenses are generally not punished as severely as an indictable offense, a conviction may still have serious repercussions – a variety of punishments are still possible for the offender including incarceration of up to six months and/or heavy fines. Furthermore, a conviction may result in loss of driving privileges, deportation, forfeiture of office, violation of probation, or the loss of the presumption of non-imprisonment for a subsequent conviction. Additionally, a petty DP or DP offender is usually required to pay court costs, an assessment to the Victims of Crime Compensation Office, and an assessment to the Safe Neighborhood Services Fund.

One potential advantage – for lack of a better word – of the distinction between a crime and a petty DP or DP offense, however, is that certain collateral consequences generally do not result upon a conviction for these lower-level offenses. Although a conviction for a DP could result in loss of driving privileges, deportation, forfeiture of office, violation of probation, or the loss of the presumption of non-imprisonment for a subsequent conviction, a conviction for a DP will not result in loss of voting rights, loss of the right to serve as a juror, or the potential of impeachment as a witness based upon the conviction.

Depending on the nature of the offense, there are also certain jurisdictional issues that arise from the distinction. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17, a municipal court has jurisdiction over a DP offense, petty DP offense, or other non-indictable offense within its territorial jurisdiction, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Superior Court. Although it is a rare occurrence, a municipal court may also try select criminal offenses of the fourth degree where there is a proper waiver of indictment and trial by jury. In certain limited circumstances, a municipal court may even have jurisdiction over an offense that did not occur within the boundaries of the municipality.

As previously mentioned, there is no presumption of imprisonment for conviction of a petty DP or DP offense – unlike certain criminal offenses where the presumption exists. Generally, defendants who have not been previously convicted of an offense are entitled to a presumption of non-incarceration; however, it is important to note that this presumption can be overcome upon a showing that the defendant’s imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public due to the nature and circumstances of both the offense and offender.

As discussed above, a conviction for any offense may have serious and/or lifelong consequences. If you have been charged with an offense, you may have questions about your rights and obligations. If so, it is important to contact an experienced attorney. This article is for information purposes only, and is neither legal advice nor the creation of an attorney client relationship.

 

Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved.

Saturday, February 22, 2014

Child Support in New Jersey: A Brief Overview of Related Rights and Obligations

Child Support in New Jersey: A Brief Overview of Related Rights and Obligations
 
By: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq.
 
            As is generally understood, New Jersey law mandates that some provision be made to insure the maintenance and well-being of minor children following the disruption of family life by separation and/or divorce of the parents.1 A common misunderstanding as to child support, however, regards a parent’s rights to waive or seek modification of a child support obligation.
 
It is well-settled under New Jersey law that the right to receive child support belongs to the child.2 As stated in Ordukaya v. Brown,3 “the obligation of all parents to provide, to the degree possible, for their children is fundamental, and cannot therefore be destroyed by the errant, capricious, or uninformed actions of the other parent.”4 Therefore, due to the State’s interest in assuring a proper level of support for all children, the right to child support cannot be waived by the custodial parent.5
 
Children in New Jersey have the right “to be supported at least according to the standard of living to which they had grown accustomed prior to the separation of their parents.”6 “In determining both the amount of money necessary to raise children of divorce and the division of that obligation between working custodial and non-custodial parents, ‘the talisman of concern is always the welfare of the child.’”7
 
New Jersey courts have discretion in making child support awards upon a proper application and consideration of the child support guidelines. Child support obligations are “mainly determined by the quality of economic life during the marriage, not bare survival.”8 The law seeks to prevent children from becoming the economic victims of divorce or separation, however, in most instances it is often difficult to maintain the pre-separation standard of living. Accordingly, a child also has the right to share in a parent’s good financial fortunes,9 and “the law is not offended” if any incidental benefit (e.g. better car, larger home, etc.) is obtained by the primary caretaking parent who receives greater amounts of child support as a result.10 To that end, it is often difficult to draw the line between a child’s needs commensurate with lifestyle and overindulgence. One illustrative case is Strahan v. Strahan, involving Giants star Michael Strahan, in which the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the trial court’s child support award of $235,984.00 per year for the court’s failure to make findings concerning the reasonable needs of the children.11
 
Once a child support obligation has been established by the court, either party may seek modification based on changed circumstances. It should be noted that a modification application may be based on either a positive or negative change in circumstances and, in regards to a request for an upward modification of child support, the custodial parent brings the action for modification on behalf of the child and not in his or her own right.12 In one of the leading cases on the issue of support modification, Lepis v. Lepis, the Court provided several examples of “changed circumstances,” including an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease in the supporting spouse’s income, and a parent’s illness, disability, or infirmity arising after the original judgment.13 In any event, the necessary showing is always the “best interests of the children.”14
 
This article is for information purposes only, and is neither legal advice nor the creation of an attorney-client relationship. If you are involved in a child custody or child support matter, you may have questions about your child’s rights, your parental rights and obligations, or about the rights and obligations of your child's other parent. If so, it is important to contact an experienced family law attorney.
 
End Notes
 
1.       See Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583 (1995), and Sheridan v. Sheridan, 247 N.J. Super. 552 (Ch. Div. 1990).
2.       Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 1993).
3.       357 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2003).
4.       Id. at 241.
5.       Martinetti, 261 N.J. Super. at 512.
6.       Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 150 (1980).
7.       Pascale, 140 N.J. at 592, citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 546 (App. Div. 1992).
8.       Lepis, 83 N.J. at 150.
9.       See Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1988), and Zazzo v. Zazzo, 245 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1990).
10.    Zazzo, 245 N.J. Super. 124.
11.    402 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2008).
12.    Martinetti, 261 N.J. Super. at 512.
13.    Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151.
14.    Id. at 157.
 
Links
 
 
Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved.
 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

After Van Dunk: the Intentional Wrong Exception to the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act

After Van Dunk: the Intentional Wrong Exception to the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act

Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq.

According to the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act,1 swift and certain payment, without regard to fault, to an employee who sustains workplace injuries is required. In exchange, employers are immune from tort liability and the employee surrenders all other forms of relief, which includes the right to sue his or her employer. Under the express terms of the statute, the employer’s immunity from liability can be overcome if the injury was the result of the employer’s “intentional wrong.”2

One of the landmark cases interpreting the “intentional wrong” exception is Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.3 In Millison, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that workers whose job required contact with asbestos could not sue their employer in common-law when they became ill as a result of that contact, even though the employer was aware of the risks associated with asbestos.4 In so holding, the Court framed the question as “what level of risk-exposure is so egregious as to constitute an ‘intentional wrong.’”5

The Millison Court instructed future courts to engage in a two-step analysis when assessing claims of intentional wrong. A court should first consider whether the actions of an employer created a “virtual certainty” of injury or death under the “conduct prong,” followed by consideration of the context in which the conduct takes place.6 Under this so-called “context prong,” courts must consider whether the resulting injury or death, and the circumstances surrounding it, fairly may be viewed as a fact of industrial life, or rather, whether it is “plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act.”7

            Some seventeen years after Millison, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered four cases that involved on-the-job accidents. In Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co.,8 the Court observed that proving both the conduct and context prongs may involve consideration of the same facts and circumstances, with the court making two separate inquires:

The first is whether…the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that the employers acted with knowledge that it was substantially certain that a worker would suffer injury. If that question is answered affirmatively, the trial court must then determine whether, if the employees’ allegations are proved, they constitute a simple fact of industrial life or are outside the purview of the conditions the Legislature could have intended to immunize under the Workers’ Compensation bar.9

The Court also emphasized in Laidlow that an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a subjective desire to harm and includes instances where an employer knows that the consequences of those acts are “substantially certain” to result in harm.10

One year later, in what may be characterized as the “intentional wrong trilogy of cases,” Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Constr. Co.,11 Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prods.,12 and Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.,13 the Court had occasion to apply the Millison conduct and context analysis in three very different fact patterns, and ultimately reaffirmed that in order for an employee to pursue its cause of action against the employer, both the conduct and context prongs must be proved. Furthermore, as enunciated in the “intentional wrong trilogy of cases,” such determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.14

            As summarized in Laidlow:

[I]n order for an employer’s act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize.15

In Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp.,16 one of the most recent cases to consider the issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court once again addressed the standard established by the Legislature that permits a worker to bring a common law tort action against his or her employer as an exception to the immunity provided under the Workers Compensation Act for job-related injuries.

In Van Dunk, the employee/plaintiff, Kenneth Van Dunk, was digging a trench to place a dewatering sump into a retention pond. One of Van Dunk’s duties involved laying down filter fabric within the trench. As the trench excavation continued and its slope reached a depth greater than five feet, Van Dunk began laying down the filter fabric from locations outside the trench. When workers experienced difficulty laying down the filter fabric from their locations outside the trench, Van Dunk volunteered to go into the trench to straighten the filter fabric. Although Van Dunk’s supervisor initially told him not to do so because of the risks attributable to the ground conditions, the supervisor, in a moment of “frustration,” told Van Dunk to go in and straighten the fabric. Van Dunk was in the trench for less than five minutes when a wall caved in burying him to his chest resulting in multiple injuries. In reversing the Appellate Division’s denial of summary judgment on behalf of the employer, the Court noted that the on-site supervisor had made a quick and extremely poor decision, but was not faced with facts which provided an objectively reasonable basis to expect that a cave-in would almost certainly occur during the brief time that the claimant was in the trench.17

We recently learned from the Van Dunk decision that sometimes even the intentional violation of an OSHA regulation by an employer may not be enough to permit the plaintiff his day in court. However, the Court in Van Dunk was unequivocal in reminding us that the courts must always look to the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether an intentional wrong has been committed so as to permit an employee’s action to move forward against his or her employer.18

As previously stated, in assessing whether an intentional wrong was committed, courts not only determine whether a “virtual certainty” of injury or death existed under the conduct prong, but also must consider the context in which the conduct takes place.19 Under the context prong, courts must determine whether the resulting injury or death, and the circumstances surrounding it, fairly may be viewed as a fact of industrial life or, rather, whether it is “plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act.”20

Whether workplace injuries can be tolerated as a simple fact of industrial life deserving immunization for the employer is a question of law, not fact;21 however, the same facts and circumstances will generally be relevant to both the conduct and context prongs.22

This article is for information purposes only, and is neither legal advice nor the creation of an attorney-client relationship. If you have been injured on the job, it is important for you to obtain an experienced workers’ compensation attorney.     

_______________________________
End Notes
  1. N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128.5
  2. N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.
  3. 101 N.J. 161 (1985).
  4. 101 N.J. at 175-76
  5. Id. at 177.
  6. Id. at 179.
  7. Id.
  8. 170 N.J. 602 (2002).
  9. Id. at 623.
  10. Id.
  11. 176 N.J. 366 (2003).
  12. 176 N.J. 385 (2003).
  13. 176 N.J. 397 (2003).
  14. Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 619, 623; Mull, 176 N.J. at 392; Tomeo, 176 N.J. at 374.
  15. Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617.
  16. 210 N.J. 449 (2012).
  17. See Id.
  18. Id.
  19. Millison, 101 N.J. at 179.
  20. Id.
  21. Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 623.
  22. Id.

________________________________

Links

http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/wc/workers/workers_index.html
http://justinsmigelskyesq.blogspot.com/2013/03/supplementing-riccis-law-mandatory.html


Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: Justin M. Smigelsky, Esq., 2014, all rights reserved: